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Introduction
On April 15, 2013, two pressure- cooker bombs went off in close succession 
near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. The blasts killed three victims 
and severely injured hundreds of others, many of whom lost limbs. What had 
been a scene of triumph and celebration quickly turned into, as one victim 
described it, a “war zone.”
After a four- day manhunt that saw nearby towns put into unprecedented 
lockdown, law enforcement finally captured alive one of the two suspects in 
nearby Watertown. Almost immediately, public debate began as to how to treat 
the suspect, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. (The second suspect, his older brother, died in 
the police shootout leading to Tsarnaev’s capture.) United States senators John 
McCain and Lindsey Graham, among others, believed that Tsarnaev should be 
labeled and treated as an “enemy combatant.” As they viewed matters:
It is clear the events we have seen over the past few days in Boston were 
an attempt to kill American citizens and terrorize a major American 
city. The accused perpetrators of these acts were not common criminals 
attempting to profit from a criminal enterprise, but terrorists trying to 
injure, maim, and kill innocent Americans. . . . Under the Law of War 
we can hold this suspect as a potential enemy combatant.1
Others, however, argued that the criminal justice system could, and should, be 
the forum for detaining and ultimately trying Tsarnaev. In the end, the latter 
voices largely prevailed,2 and in time Tsarnaev stood trial on a host of federal 
criminal charges. Almost two years to the day after the bombings, a jury con-
victed Tsarnaev of all charges and weeks later recommended a death sentence.
But what if those voices that argued in favor of treating Tsarnaev as an 
“enemy combatant” had prevailed and the government had detained him in 
military custody without affording him a criminal trial? Was such a course 
a legally viable option for the government? Or was the government legally 
required to prosecute Tsarnaev, a naturalized U.S. citizen, in civilian courts in 
order to justify his detention?
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Only a few years earlier, the Bush administration had faced similar ques-
tions and concluded that no such requirement existed with respect to hundreds 
of detainees— including two U.S. citizens— who had been captured after the 
devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In one such case, President 
George W. Bush declared that José Padilla, a U.S. citizen arrested at Chicago’s 
O’Hare International Airport, was an “enemy combatant” who should be 
detained in military custody, rather than charged criminally and prosecuted.
In making this declaration, the president wrote that he had “determine[d] ” 
that Padilla “[was] closely associated with al Qaeda, an international terrorist 
organization with which the United States is at war”; had carried out “war- 
like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism” 
against the United States; “possesse[d] intelligence” that might assist the gov-
ernment in its counterterrorism efforts; and “represent[ed] a continuing, pres-
ent and grave danger to the national security of the United States,” such that 
his immediate detention “[was] necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda 
in its efforts to attack the United States.”3
Extensive litigation followed over the lawfulness of Padilla’s detention. In 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Padilla’s lawyers argued that his deten-
tion violated the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. That provision 
declares that “[t] he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it.”4 Specifically, Padilla argued that because the government had not 
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the wake of the attacks 
of September 11— as, for example, President Abraham Lincoln had done dur-
ing the Civil War— the government had no authority to hold him unless it 
charged him with a crime and prosecuted him in due course.
Padilla’s case reached the Supreme Court only to be dismissed on juris-
dictional grounds. Two years later, when Padilla again sought review in that 
court, the government rendered the case moot by indicting Padilla on various 
criminal charges and transferring him to the control of civilian authorities for 
prosecution. Accordingly, the Court declined to take up the case anew.5 In the 
meantime, the government had detained Padilla in military custody without 
pending criminal charges for over three years.
Meanwhile, in 2004, the Supreme Court reached the merits in another 
case raising many of the same issues. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld involved a habeas 
petition filed on behalf of a U.S. citizen who had been captured by U.S. allies 
in Afghanistan where he was reportedly fighting with the Taliban against 
U.S. forces. Like Padilla, Hamdi argued that his detention as an enemy com-
batant on American soil violated the Constitution. A fractured Supreme Court 
disagreed, ultimately concluding that “[t] here is no bar to this Nation’s holding 
one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant.”6
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Hamdi was a case of first impression, but the foundations of its hold-
ing date back to World War II. In the months following the Japanese bomb-
ing of Pearl Harbor, the U.S.  government ordered over 120,000 Japanese 
Americans living in the western United States— including over 70,000 
citizens— to evacuate their homes and report to Relocation Centers for 
long- term detention. Under the auspices of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
infamous Presidential Order 9066, the military regulations that set these 
events in motion were predicated upon generalized suspicion that Japanese 
Americans— including those who were U.S. citizens— might spy on behalf 
of the enemy Japanese Empire. As one of its many legacies, this episode in 
American history established a precedent that the government may detain 
U.S. citizens for national security purposes outside the criminal process in 
the absence of a suspension.
These precedents suggest that the Constitution poses no bar to the deten-
tion of U.S.  citizens outside the criminal process for national security pur-
poses. It would seem to follow that detaining Dzhokhar Tsarnaev as an enemy 
combatant was a legal option for the government in the wake of the Boston 
Marathon bombings. But what if the Constitution dictates otherwise?
QuestiOns like tHese— regarding the scope of executive power to arrest 
and detain in times of war and the meaning of the Suspension Clause and 
the constitutional habeas privilege— implicate enormously important issues 
involving the role of the U.S. Constitution in wartime. Unfortunately, how-
ever, modern debates over these matters have taken place largely in a histor-
ical vacuum. But as these pages reveal, many of the questions implicated in 
modern debates have arisen before and, accordingly, there exists a wealth of 
Anglo- American legal and historical experience that can inform and enrich 
our understanding today.
This book sets out to recover that neglected history and recount it here. 
Specifically, the book identifies and explains the origins of the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus in English legal tradition, documents how those ori-
gins heavily influenced the development of early American law and the draft-
ing of the U.S. Constitution, and then traces how both the privilege and the 
concept of suspension have been understood over the course of American 
history. Later chapters explore how the challenges posed by modern warfare 
have placed considerable strain on long- standing conceptions of the privilege 
and the role of suspension, resulting in what the book calls “the forgotten 
Suspension Clause.”
This undertaking is the first of its kind to lay out as comprehensively as 
possible the full story of the legal and political history of the constitutional 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in wartime. The story begins in England 
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before American independence— where the origins of American law may be 
found— before crossing the Atlantic to take the story forward on American 
shores, first in the American colonies and then in the independent United 
States. To piece together its many parts, the book draws upon a wealth of origi-
nal and, in many cases, heretofore untapped historical and archival resources 
to shed light on the purpose and role of the Suspension Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution.
As is revealed in these pages, this forgotten history has much to contribute 
to modern debates. The history detailed here provides insight on many impor-
tant questions, including: What are the origins of the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus in the Anglo- American legal tradition? What protections does 
the privilege embody? Who may lay claim to the privilege? Is affirmative provi-
sion of that privilege guaranteed by the Constitution? How far does the privi-
lege reach? Does it go beyond U.S. borders? What is the role of suspension and 
which branch of government may declare a suspension? Can the suspension 
power be delegated? Can the courts review exercises of the suspension author-
ity, or are such decisions so political in nature as to be immune from judicial 
review? How does the suspension power relate to martial law? And finally, 
what do the protections long associated with the privilege tell us about the 
propriety of employing military tribunals to try individuals without affording 
them the safeguards of the criminal process and independent courts? Each of 
these questions is explored in the pages that follow in the course of recount-
ing the story of the privilege and suspension throughout Anglo- American 
history.
Part I begins by tracing the origins of the privilege in England. The story 
of habeas corpus begins hundreds of years ago, with the most important 
events in its evolution taking place in the seventeenth century. During the 
early decades of that century, John Selden and Sir Edward Coke argued against 
the king’s power to detain persons per mandatum domini regis, or “for matter 
of state.” In so doing, they set in motion a series of significant events, which 
culminated in the passage of the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.7 This 
enormously important Act followed from Parliament’s desire both to limit 
the authority of the king and his ministers to detain individuals outside the 
criminal process and to constrain the royal courts from countenancing such 
practices, and therefore accompanied the rise of parliamentary supremacy. 
To accomplish this end, the Act’s seventh section provided that it was only 
through timely prosecution and conviction that a person who could claim the 
protection of domestic law could be detained for criminal or national security 
purposes. If a person detained on such a basis was not timely prosecuted, 
moreover, the Act promised the remedy of discharge and provided that judges 
9780199856664_Book.indb   4 9/25/2017   10:42:09 PM
 Introduction 5
violated its mandates under threat of penalty. It is no wonder that decades 
later, in lectures that were read by virtually every early American studying law, 
Blackstone glorified the Habeas Corpus Act as a “bulwark” of “per[s] onal lib-
erty” and declared it a “second magna carta.”8
As Part I also shows, the English Habeas Corpus Act included no exception 
for times of war. Thus, it took little time for Parliament to invent the concept 
of suspension in the face of war and recurrent threats to the throne, enacting 
the first suspension in the wake of the Glorious Revolution just ten years after 
passage of the Habeas Corpus Act. As Part I concludes, this uneasy concep-
tual pairing of the Act’s protections and their suspension in times of crisis 
created the model that came to govern on both sides of the Atlantic during the 
American Revolutionary War.
Following the story from England to American shores, Part II details 
how the Crown’s position that the Act did not apply in the American colo-
nies constituted a major complaint about British rule and contributed to the 
movement for independence. In 1774, for example, the Continental Congress 
decried the fact that colonists were “the subjects of an arbitrary government, 
deprived of trial by jury, and when imprisoned cannot claim the benefit of 
the habeas corpus Act, that great bulwark and palladium of English liberty.”9 
The Americans wanted to enjoy the benefits and protections of this “sec-
ond magna carta” too. Accordingly, the importation of the English Habeas 
Corpus Act into early American jurisprudence followed quickly in the wake 
of independence. Examples on this score abound. To take but one, Georgia 
included in its Constitution of 1777 express provision that “[t] he principles 
of the habeas- corpus act shall be a part of this constitution.”10 (To make all the 
more clear that the English Act proved the basis of its Constitution’s habeas 
provision, Georgia’s legislature annexed verbatim copies of the Act to the 
original distribution of the 1777 Constitution.11) And just three months before 
the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in 1787, New York 
passed a statute practically identical to the 1679 English Habeas Corpus Act.12 
By 1833, the English Act’s influence was so pervasive that Justice Joseph Story 
wrote in his famous Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States that 
it “has been, in substance, incorporated into the jurisprudence of every state 
in the Union.”13
This was the backdrop against which the Founding generation wrote the 
Constitution and adopted the Suspension Clause. As Part II reveals, refer-
ences to the English Habeas Corpus Act pervaded the ratification debates and 
highlight how the Act and the English suspension model proved the founda-
tion for the Clause’s terms. Alexander Hamilton, for example, celebrated and 
promoted the draft Constitution in the Federalist Papers specifically because it 
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“provided . . . in the most ample manner” for “trial by jury in criminal cases, 
aided by the habeas corpus act.”14 Indeed, the protections of the Act were so 
important to the Founding generation that they called the habeas “privilege” 
nothing less than “essential to freedom.”15 At the same time, the Founding 
generation understood all too well the extraordinary nature of suspension, as 
Parliament had enacted a series of suspensions to legalize the detention of 
American “Rebels” in England during the war “like other prisoners of war.”16 
Thus, the Constitution included strict limitations on when the power to sus-
pend could be invoked— namely, only “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public Safety may require it.” Part II describes how these same concerns 
regarding the potential abuse of the suspension power informed early debates 
and led Congress to reject the first proposed suspension under the new 
Constitution, which President Thomas Jefferson had requested to address the 
Burr Conspiracy.
With the Civil War, however, suspension finally became part of the 
American constitutional experience. As described in Part III, President 
Abraham Lincoln wasted little time in the face of what he viewed as a “clear, 
flagrant, and gigantic case of Rebellion”17 to claim the suspension power for 
himself, soon provoking a confrontation with Chief Justice Roger B. Taney. 
Relying heavily on the English Habeas Corpus Act, Taney ruled in Ex parte 
Merryman that the president could not suspend in the absence of congressio-
nal action and that Lincoln’s claim to the contrary asserted that “the constitu-
tion of the United States has conferred upon him more regal and absolute 
power over the liberty of the citizen, than the people of England have thought 
it safe to entrust to the crown. . . .”18 After two years of debating suspension, 
Congress finally passed legislation, delegating much of its administration to 
Lincoln. Although many members of Congress disagreed with the president’s 
view that he could proclaim a suspension on his own, Congress’s 1863 Act 
was fully consistent with Lincoln’s belief that a suspension was necessary to 
hold both the disaffected and Confederate soldiers as prisoners outside the 
criminal process.19 This position followed from the fact that the Union viewed 
the secession of the Confederate States as illegal, and considered those who 
supported the Confederacy to be traitors who needed to return to their proper 
allegiance.20 As is also detailed in Part III, the Confederacy witnessed its own 
series of suspensions— three in total— and they provide a fascinating point 
of comparison to events unfolding in the North. For his part, Confederate 
president Jefferson Davis never once claimed the power to suspend on his 
own (and indeed criticized Lincoln for doing so). Further, late in the war, the 
Confederate Congress took the position that the suspension authority could 
never be delegated in any form to its president. Nonetheless, the North and 
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South alike viewed suspension as a necessary predicate to detain persons who 
could claim the protection of domestic law outside the criminal process.
Following the war, suspension returned to the national stage when 
Congress authorized President Ulysses S.  Grant to suspend the privilege 
to combat the rise of Ku Klux Klan violence in the South.21 President Grant 
referred to the legislation as conferring upon him “extraordinary powers” that 
he would invoke only “reluctant[ly]” as needed “for the purpose of securing to 
all citizens . . . enjoyment of the rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution 
and laws.”22 Under the suspension, mili tary officers employed their expanded 
powers to infiltrate the Klan by arresting its members in droves. As things 
unfolded, consistent with the long- standing operation of the suspension 
model, everyone at the time understood that with the lapsing of the suspen-
sion, those in custody had to be charged criminally or released.
As Part IV reveals, however, in the twentieth and twenty- first centuries, 
this long- established understanding of the Suspension Clause fell by the way-
side. During World War II, under the auspices of President Roosevelt’s Order 
9066,23 the military forced over 120,000 Japanese Americans— including 
over 70,000 citizens—to leave their homes on the West Coast and report to 
barren camps called “Relocation Centers” that were surrounded by barbed 
wire and armed guards for detentions averaging three years in length. As 
noted above, these policies were predicated solely upon a generalized suspi-
cion that such persons might spy on behalf of the enemy Japanese Empire. 
The policies also lacked any factual basis, a point recognized by many govern-
ment officials at the time, including Federal Bureau of Investigation Director 
J.  Edgar Hoover. Further, many government lawyers— including Attorney 
General Francis Biddle— argued during this period that such a policy, at least 
as applied to U.S. citizens, would violate the Suspension Clause. As Biddle 
put it, “unless the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, I  do not know any 
way in which Japanese born in this country, and therefore American citizens, 
could be interned.”24 When Ex parte Endo, a habeas case directly challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the camps, finally made its way to the Supreme 
Court, the Court delayed handing down its decision for political reasons 
and ultimately avoided wading into the constitutional issues in play, instead 
deciding the case in favor of the petitioner by narrowly interpreting the mili-
tary’s governing regulations.25 In the meantime, the internment of Japanese 
Americans created a precedent that gave constitutional sanction to “a policy of 
mass incarceration under military auspices.”26
As explained in Part IV, this precedent laid the groundwork for events 
that followed in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. During this 
period, as noted above, the government detained two U.S. citizens as enemy 
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combatants on American soil, and in its 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
the Supreme Court sanctioned the idea that the Constitution poses no bar to 
such detentions. But as the extensive history set forth in these pages dem-
onstrates, Hamdi’s recognition of the concept of a citizen enemy combatant 
overlooks the enormously important influence of the English Habeas Corpus 
Act and suspension model on the development of Anglo- American habeas law 
and stands at odds with the Founding generation’s expectations as to how the 
Constitution would operate in times of war. Indeed, as the history set forth 
in these pages reveals, well through the Reconstruction period, the domi-
nant legal and political view of the habeas privilege constitutionalized in the 
Suspension Clause understood it to preclude the government, in the absence 
of a valid suspension, from detaining persons who could claim the protection 
of domestic law outside the criminal process.
Part IV concludes by discussing the most recent Supreme Court deci-
sion on the Suspension Clause, Boumediene v.  Bush.27 In a 5- 4 ruling, the 
Boumediene Court concluded that alien detainees held at the U.S.  military 
installation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, enjoyed “the constitutional privilege 
of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn except in conformance 
with the Suspension Clause.” At the same time, however, the Court did not 
afford such detainees the traditional remedy of release from custody. Rather, 
the Court concluded that the detainees were entitled to greater opportuni-
ties to challenge their designation as enemy combatants in federal court 
than Congress had provided them in governing statutes. As Part IV explores, 
Boumediene presented the Court with a series of difficult questions that lacked 
any close historical analogies. Thus, the Court relied upon larger structural 
considerations and cited “the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern 
age” to support its holding. In so doing, the Court interpreted the Suspension 
Clause to promise access to a tribunal to contest the underlying lawfulness 
of detention, with the legality of the detention to be defined by law external 
to the Suspension Clause. (In other words, the Court never questioned the 
premise that some detainees could be held as enemy combatants; the hold-
ing instead promised detainees greater process to challenge that classifica-
tion.) This aspect of Boumediene may have unnecessarily conflated the Court’s 
Suspension Clause jurisprudence with its modern due process case law— a 
result that could in turn limit the relief available and pose conceptual prob-
lems in future Suspension Clause cases.
FinAlly, A WOrd on the role of history in constitutional interpretation is 
in order. Although legal jurists and scholars argue over whether history 
should be the decisive factor in ascertaining the meaning and application 
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of the Constitution, no one seriously questions that history is deeply rele-
vant to the debate. With respect to the Suspension Clause, moreover, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in recent years that “ ‘at the absolute 
minimum,’ the Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution 
was drafted and ratified.”28 This proposition necessarily invites reference to 
history when interpreting and applying the Suspension Clause, an idea that 
is hardly new. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote long ago that understand-
ing the role of habeas corpus in the U.S. Constitution requires looking to 
the privilege’s origins in English law. As he put it, the phrase “privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus” was “used in the constitution, as one which was 
well understood.” Thus, to interpret the Suspension Clause, Marshall coun-
seled, one must look to “that law which is in a considerable degree incorpo-
rated into our own”— namely, “the celebrated habeas corpus act” of 1679.29
More generally, it is hard to imagine how one could even begin to under-
stand the meaning of the Suspension Clause without turning to history. After 
all, the Clause itself adopts terms of art taken directly from English legal tra-
dition and therefore surely invites inquiry into the English backdrop that 
informed its drafting, not unlike the text of the Seventh Amendment, which 
expressly does so.30 At a minimum, therefore, any discussion of how to inter-
pret the Suspension Clause should begin with that backdrop. To be sure, as 
many have recognized, the Founding generation may not have fully worked 
out every aspect of the Constitution’s application at the time of its ratifica-
tion. James Madison, for one, called the Constitution “nothing more than 
the draught of a plan . . . until life and validity were breathed into it,”31 and 
he suggested that its meaning might be “considered as more or less obscure 
and equivocal, until . . . liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular 
discussions and adjudications.”32 On this view, then, the early history of the 
Suspension Clause and the periods when it first came to be tested during the 
Jefferson, Lincoln, and Grant administrations also have much to contribute to 
debates over the Clause’s role in the constitutional framework.
In the end, this book largely— although not entirely— leaves it to oth-
ers to  decide how to employ the full historical account of the Suspension 
Clause set forth in its pages. Because the modern understanding of the role 
of habeas corpus in wartime has departed so dramatically from the model 
that had long governed in Anglo- American law and that which the Founding 
generation sought to achieve in adopting the Suspension Clause, the current 
state of habeas jurisprudence should trouble anyone who cares about the 
Constitution. It follows, the book argues, that the time has come to reconsider 
the proper  role of the Suspension Clause in our constitutional framework 
going forward.
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